Perhaps more than any other disease, malaria serves as a potent symbol of the struggle between humankind and the natural world. Scientific and technical advances-from Ross's identification of the malaria vector to the application of DDT The official histories of the Allied medical services, written in the first decade or so after 1945, were justly proud of this achievement and celebrated the work of the scientists and medical officers that had effected it. But this triumphalism never entirely obscured a more critical rendering of events, which saw the successes of military medicine not as the inevitable outcome of scientific progress but as a hard-won battle over military ignorance. The medical officer was portrayed as an heroic figure, battling against "red tape" and incompetent commanders, whose cause was vindicated by the "victory" over malaria and ultimately over the Axis Powers. These histories are free of the distortion and bias which characterizes so many official histories of the First World War but they are unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. Firstly, whilst giving credit to "enlightened" military commanders, they still tend to exaggerate the role of the medical officer vis a' vis his combatant counterpart. They also exaggerate the military importance of the medical contribution to the war effort which, though considerable, was less marked than the official histories would have us believe. Thirdly, they do not attempt any systematic analysis of the relationship between technological innovation and diffusion in the armed forces. The benefits of new technologies are seen as self-evident and any reluctance to utilize them as proof of the ignorance or incompetence of the commanders concerned. Their story is one of "lessons learnt" and "forgotten", with very little consideration of why these lessons were learnt or forgotten.
Perhaps more than any other disease, malaria serves as a potent symbol of the struggle between humankind and the natural world. Scientific and technical advances-from Ross's identification of the malaria vector to the application of DDT during the Second World War-have promised much but have so far failed to provide any lasting solution to the devastation caused by the disease. Yet at the close of the Second World War it was confidently expected that malaria could be not only controlled but eradicated, since newly-developed drugs and insecticides had seemingly paved the way for Allied victory in Italy, South East Asia, and the Far East.
The official histories of the Allied medical services, written in the first decade or so after 1945, were justly proud of this achievement and celebrated the work of the scientists and medical officers that had effected it. But this triumphalism never entirely obscured a more critical rendering of events, which saw the successes of military medicine not as the inevitable outcome of scientific progress but as a hard-won battle over military ignorance. The medical officer was portrayed as an heroic figure, battling against "red tape" and incompetent commanders, whose cause was vindicated by the "victory" over malaria and ultimately over the Axis Powers. These histories are free of the distortion and bias which characterizes so many official histories of the First World War but they are unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. Firstly, whilst giving credit to "enlightened" military commanders, they still tend to exaggerate the role of the medical officer vis a' vis his combatant counterpart. They also exaggerate the military importance of the medical contribution to the war effort which, though considerable, was less marked than the official histories would have us believe. Thirdly, they do not attempt any systematic analysis of the relationship between technological innovation and diffusion in the armed forces. The benefits of new technologies are seen as self-evident and any reluctance to utilize them as proof of the ignorance or incompetence of the commanders concerned. Their story is one of "lessons learnt" and "forgotten", with very little consideration of why these lessons were learnt or forgotten. When we come to consider the possibility of anti-mosquito measures on a large scale we are forced to recognise that, in order to be effective, these would probably have to be very extensive and consequently somewhat costly. They will be a necessary corollary of the scheme for land reclamation and town planning which must be carried into effect if Such difficulties were not the only obstacle to malaria prevention. Many commanding officers were not convinced that much could be achieved by drainage and other such measures, and refused to divert manpower from tasks which they regarded as more essential. At a town not far from Salonika, Captain A Cecil Alport, RAMC, was forced to by-pass his commanding officer and to arrange anti-malaria work through a local major and the French and Serbian commanders. Having gained their support, he secured POWs, civilians and French troops for the construction of a canal to drain the marshes around the town. By the end of the war much of this land was under cultivation and malaria admissions had allegedly decreased to negligible proportions.19
Where drainage was not an option, as in mobile campaigns, commanders could always insist that their troops use some form of personal protection, whether in the form of mosquito nets or prophylaxis with quinine. But many MOs were still uncertain about the effectiveness of quinine prophylaxis. Major C H Tredgold, RAMC, serving in Macedonia, noticed that some of the men in his division who had received quinine had resisted illness but that many still fell sick.20 Cecil Alport, also serving in Macedonia, was far more pessimistic: in his opinion quinine prophylaxis had been an "absolute failure" and an extra-large dose would be required if it were to have any real effect. Alport believed that it was better to rely upon mosquito nets if possible.2' Most other medical officers in Macedonia, including the DMS, General Whitehead, were similarly disillusioned with quinine as a preventive measure. Whitehead reported in 1916 that the results of quinine prophylaxis had been disappointing and that "very many men have contracted malaria who had been taking quinine regularly".22
A sub-committee of the MRC appointed to look into malaria in Macedonia endorsed the opinions of medical officers there. The committee reported in January 1917 that there was "no good evidence that prophylactic quinine has lessened the incidence of malaria".23 It should be noted that the committee included both partisans of quinine prophylaxis, such 18 32/5112, PRO. acquainted with the measures necessary for protection against malaria.32 The neglect of anti-malaria discipline was also much criticized in France: quinine prophylaxis was ordered in the French Army in 1916 but was never enforced. Medical officers insisted that this lapse had occurred because combatant officers were not sufficiently aware of the dangers and of what could be done to prevent malaria. A "mission anti-paludique" was sent to Macedonia the following year, with apparently successful results33 but such claims must be treated with caution, given the great difficulty of maintaining anti-malaria discipline on active service.
In East Africa the failure of senior commanders to make provisions for malaria prevention had similarly tragic results. Indian troops had been specially chosen for service in East Africa since it was believed they had acquired a degree of immunity to diseases like malaria. It was said that European troops did "not last long in Africa" and that the newly-raised African regiments were not yet a match for the more experienced German colonial troops.34 But this supposed immunity was barely apparent: from 8 a palliative since the real need, as General Scott pointed out, was for the replacement of disease-ridden regiments with fresh troops from India (the 12,000 white South African troops serving in East Africa had already been withdrawn). "All Indian units here", he urged, "should be given a period of complete rest in a suitable climate and surroundings with special medical supervision, good food, ample milk, fresh vegetables, comfortable clothing, and these cannot be secured in East Africa." His own preference was to decamp to Nairobi, where the climate and accommodation were more congenial.39 General van Deventer was of like mind, pointing out that the frontier unrest which had kept many regiments tied to India had been settled, there now being no good reason why Indian troops in East Africa should not be relieved.40 Yet the Commander-in-Chief in India still refused "on account of the excessive wastage amongst Indian troops which occurs there and of the shortness in India of trained men to form the nucleus of a trained battalion. Briefly ... we believe that Indian troops are unsuited for service in East Africa and could be profitably employed elsewhere".41 This was no doubt good news for the regiments still in India but for those in East Africa it was little short of a death sentence.
The failure to control malaria in East Africa drew a good deal of criticism in Britain: questions were asked in the House of Commons about sickness among troops and reassurances sought from the Under-Secretary for War.42 The British Medical Journal also stressed the urgent need for anti-malaria discipline and the education of troops in preventive measures. Its editor was particularly concerned about the ordinary soldier's "prejudice" against quinine and his apparent reluctance to use mosquito nets.43 Medical provisions in East Africa improved slowly-probably as a result of these protests-but it was a case of too little too late. Malaria control was taken seriously only in the later phases of military operations, by which time the troops were already saturated with infection.44
The Second World War At the outbreak of the Second World War, most medical officers still endorsed Ross's view that quinine could only suppress, not prevent, malarial infection. Consequently, the interwar literature on malaria prevention in the British and Imperial forces had been concerned almost entirely with mosquito destruction and drainage45 and MOs were advised not to rely too heavily on "suppressive treatment", as the preventive use of quinine was now termed. A memorandum issued to British forces in the Middle East in 1942 stated that suppression was an emergency measure, to be contemplated only when other measures were impracticable.46 In many theatres of the war, supplies of quinine were, in any case, intermittent, especially when an army was in retreat.47 39 In 1942, following the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies, the main source of quinine was closed to the Allies and attention began to turn to synthetic substitutes. One such substitute was mepacrine (also known as atebrin); a substance which had been synthesized by German chemists in the early 1930s. Successful field trials aroused German hopes that it would give their forces the edge in any war in Africa or the Mediterranean. But the Germans had sold the secrets of the new drug to the Americans and, although this information omitted vital details, it had allowed the Americans and the British to synthesize small quantities of mepacrine before the war began. With the entry of America into the war in 1941, and the fall of Java to the Japanese in the following year, British, American and Dominion chemists stepped up production of the drug, which was made available to front-line units from 1942.48
But mepacrine prophylaxis initially fared no better than quinine. After being used in West and North Africa in 1942-3, its use was discontinued in some areas because of its allegedly toxic side effects.49 However, some MOs claimed that the real problem was not mepacrine itself but the continuing hostility of combatant offlcers and men. The replacement of quinine with mepacrine had failed to scotch rumours circulating in both the British and Indian armies regarding anti-malarial drugs and sexual impotence. Suspicion of anti-malarial drugs was also heightened in India by reports of the death of twelve soldiers in the Eastern Army as a result of the intravenous injection of large "therapeutic" doses of quinine.50
Such reservations were not easily dispelled, despite considerable effort on the part of the military authorities. In North Africa during 1942, the British forces' newspaper Union Jack conducted a long educational campaign among British troops which stressed their responsibilities towards their comrades in arms. "Every soldier", it insisted, "should be aware that in becoming a malaria casualty, through neglect of [anti-malarial] precautions he is wilfully endangering his healthy neighbour because of his own infection".51
Neglecting to take one's mepacrine amounted to a crime against one's fellows: "Any soldier who steals from a comrade has sunk pretty low", declared the Union Jack, "Yet that is exactly what scores are doing right now in this theatre of war. . . . Through thoughtless stupidity and not through malice. But that doesn't let them out."52 In India, too, instructions urged that "Strong disciplinary action should be taken against those who fail to carry out routine prophylactic measures during the malaria season. Failure to observe such measures is tantamount to self-inflicted injury".53
The invasion of Sicily in the summer of 1943, during which over 20,000 British troops were admitted to hospital with malaria, showed that such appeals had had little effect. Many officers failed to take any precautions against malaria and numerous cases occurred among the British force even before it had left North Africa (almost 500 behind by the 7th Army alone). In Sicily the situation was even worse: malaria units did not arrive until very late in the day and mepacrine suppression was never enforced.54 Nor were the troops encouraged by their officers to use mosquito nets or insect repellents, as both were generally unpopular.55 Troops had been instructed in malaria prevention but too much of their training was theoretical. The military authorities also made a number of errors and misjudgements, some of which had lasting consequences: troops were issued with shorts which left their legs exposed to mosquito bites in the evening; instructions regarding mepacrine suppression were misleading, giving the impression that the drug was to be taken for five weeks only; an older and more greasy type of protective cream was issued, instead of the newer one that had been authorized. According to Lt-Col A S Thompson, the latter error was "the origin of a prejudice against repellents of any kind, which lingered to the end of the war. Men who had been in Sicily swore that "antimosquito cream" actually attracted mosquitoes".56
But an even more fundamental obstacle stood in the way of malaria control: the indifference and even hostility to anti-malaria precautions displayed by those in positions of responsibility. was that it demonstrated that mepacrine was effective against all forms of malaria. The conclusion, accepted with some reserve by the General Staff, was that problems encountered in malaria prevention were due not to any defect in the drug but to lapses in anti-malarial discipline.63 Strict discipline, as a memorandum of 1944 put it, was now identified as "the essence of successful anti-malarial measures".64
The truth of this maxim was amply demonstrated in both positive and negative senses by developments in the last two years of the war. In 1945 Fairley observed approvingly that the malaria rate among the Australian force in New Guinea had declined progressively from 740 per 1000 in December 1943 to only 20 per 1000 by November 1944, despite the fact that troops were still stationed in hyper-endemic areas.65 He believed that this improvement had been achieved by tightening mepacrine discipline and by better education of combatants in malaria prevention. By the end of the war, the Australian Army had come to regard knowledge of mepacrine administration and other anti-malarial measures as "an essential part of a soldier's training for jungle warfare", and their implementation as "a matter of strict military discipline".66
Another striking illustration of what could be achieved through discipline was the successful campaign against malaria in South East Asia. General Slim, commanding the 14th Army (a British, Indian, and African force), is generally remembered for repelling the Japanese invasion of Arakan in 1944 and the reconquest of Burma the following year. Malaria control was to play a crucial part in the campaign, and, in his memoirs Defeat into victory, Slim rated health as his most important problem after supply. In 1943 the malaria rate averaged 60 per cent of the total strength of his Army, and was considerably higher among forward troops. The Indian 6th Infantry Brigade operating in Arakan at the beginning of 1943 suffered a 100 per cent infection rate,67 and in the last three months of that year, some 18,000 British malaria cases were evacuated from India.68 Slim's solution was to put pressure upon unit commanders. As he put it:
Good doctors are no use without good discipline. More than half the battle against disease is fought not by doctors, but by regimental officers. It is they who see that the daily dose of mepacrine ... is On the advice of the Consultant Malariologist, India Command, Major-General Sir Gordon Covell, mepacrine suppression was enforced with vigour throughout Burma. Covell had visited Cairns and New Guinea, and had seen the results of effective suppression at first hand.70 Slim also had the support of Lord Mountbatten, who assumed supreme command of Allied forces in South East Asia in 1943 . Mountbatten took a personal interest in medicine and began a vigorous onslaught on the Indian administration to secure better medical provisions;71 although there remained some problems with the supply of mepacrine during mobile operations.72 Education in mepacrine suppression was also stepped up, apparently with good effect. A report on malaria in the British force during operations in Arakan from March to June 1943 claimed that "In spite of the usual barrack-room rumours that the drug caused impotence, men came to place considerable reliance on it, and infantrymen would come to the R.A.P. [Regimental Aid Post] for the drug if they had missed it for any reason". The only problem was that the new regime imposed by Slim, which involved daily parades at which the drug was distributed by company, platoon and section commanders, was liable to be upset by active service. 73 Despite these difficulties, Slim's determination to overcome the problem of malaria gradually bore fruit. Admissions to hospital from malaria among British soldiers in Burma decreased from a high of 60 per cent of total strength in 1943 to around 10 per cent in 1945. The death rate was also greatly reduced, and from May 1944 to November 1945 it is claimed that there were only 6 deaths out of almost 14,000 cases.74 Some caution is advisable when assessing these figures, for it is doubtful whether many malaria cases were in a position to be evacuated and therefore admitted to hospital. Yet it was clear to most observers that improved anti-malarial discipline had given the Allies the edge in Burma. Increasing confidence in malaria control enabled Mountbatten and Slim to continue their advance through the monsoon, when the malaria season was at its height.75 The Japanese, by contrast, were gravely weakened by malaria, and blood samples obtained from captured Japanese soldiers revealed rates of infection ranging from around 30 to 49 per cent.76 The supply of medicines and other vital equipment to the Japanese Army had broken down and anti-malaria discipline lapsed as the army retreated. 77 Anti-malaria discipline undeniably gave the Allies a comparative advantage over the Japanese but it is necessary to qualify some of the more extravagant claims made by medical officers after the event. The DGAMS of the Indian Army, for example, gave 69 Field-Marshal Sir William Slim, Defeat into credence to the popular belief that Slim and Mountbatten had deliberately chosen as their battleground the most malarious areas of Burma in the knowledge that their medical services were infinitely superior to those of the Japanese. Slim denied this in his autobiography and disclosed that he was still far from confident about his army's precautions against malaria. It was this lingering doubt about the success of the antimalaria campaign that led Slim to chose East African troops to lead the force into the Kabaw Valley, on account of their (supposedly) greater immunity to the disease. He further maintained that any superiority his medical service may have enjoyed was not due to any greater professionalism on its part but merely to the fact that the Japanese Army was starved of supplies and in disarray from its hasty retreat.78
Although the results of mepacrine suppression were impressive, malaria control was not simply a matter of personal protection. Where conditions permitted, mosquito eradication measures of various kinds were implemented, including traditional methods such as the oiling of breeding pools, as well as the use of insecticide sprays more appropriate to mobile warfare. Between the wars, the insecticide Paris Green (first used against the Colorado beetle in the USA) came to be employed against mosquitoes in the British colonies.79 However, in the years immediately before the war, pyrethrum-based insecticides took pride of place. The only drawback with pyrethrum was that it was extracted from flowers which grew mostly in Dalmatia and Japan, and at the outbreak of war the Allies were left with Kenya as the sole supplier. Since Kenyan supplies were insufficient, a substitute had to be found and this came in the form of dichlorodiphenyltrichloroephane (DDT), first synthesized by a German chemist in 1874. The insecticidal properties of DDT were not discovered until 1939, after which tests were conducted in the USA and in Britain to determine its uses and its toxicity. Even then, there was some delay before the substance was being used in the field and the first large-scale use of DDT did not occur until the beginning of 1944, during the Naples typhus epidemic. Subsequently, field trials which tested the efficacy of DDT against mosquitoes were conducted in India and in the South West Pacific by US forces.80
The success of these trials led to the widespread use of DDT in malaria control and it was to prove especially important in Italy, where as a result of war damage and deliberate sabotage by the Germans large areas of reclaimed coastal land had been flooded. The Germans had also sabotaged the canals draining land north of Naples, as well as the drainage system of the Pontine Marshes, which lay in front of the Allies as they advanced towards Rome. It seemed as if malaria was being used consciously as a weapon of war.81 78 Slim, op. cit., note 69 above, p. 354. B L Raina However, the expected epidemic among both civilians and soldiers never occurred. This was due, in part, to the improvement of anti-malarial discipline after the Sicilian campaign and partly to the use of DDT, which kept malaria under control outside of military camps. A Malaria Control Branch was set up under Colonel Paul Russell of the US Army Medical Corps to act in an advisory capacity to the Allied armies and civilian public health bodies. Russell and his colleagues showed that DDT could be used both as a larvicide and in the destruction of adult mosquitoes, and that it could be sprayed by hand or by aircraft; the latter being particularly useful in flooded areas like the Pontine Marshes. It was also discovered that buildings sprayed with DDT remained lethal to adult mosquitoes for up to two months. This was of great importance from a military point of view, for it provided a method of control which enabled fast-moving forces to be protected in forward areas. The contrast between medical provisions in Slim's 14th Army and Wingate's Chindits could not be more striking. These differences may be attributed partly to the nature of the campaign: operating behind the lines; the Chindits did not have the benefit of either mosquito brigades or aerial spraying with DDT. The areas in which they fought were also intensely malarious and even where mepacrine suppression was rigorously enforced, levels of infection were such that the dosage had to be increased considerably, and not always with great success.92 But Wingate cannot escape responsibility for the high sickness rate in his force: he was clearly antagonistic towards MOs and did nothing to encourage an interest in malaria prevention among his officers or men. Indeed, Wingate was heavily criticized for his neglect of medical arrangements by an official report issued in 1945.93 Slim, by contrast, was the very model of the new professional soldier: strict yet compassionate, and keen to apply the principles of "man-management" and "manpower economy". He was also ready to take advice from experts, whereas Wingate was imperious and refused to listen to or to defer to anyone. The success of mepacrine suppression depended on a readiness to impose discipline on regimental officers, while the successful use of DDT depended on closer co-operation between medical and combatant branches of the army. But discipline and planning are only part of the story: a concerted effort was made to educate troops in malaria prevention and to make personal precautions a matter of military honour. Soldiers were instructed in malaria prevention during the First World War but these attempts were often half-hearted, for there was little faith in the ordinary soldier's capacity for education and self-discipline. During the Second World War, by contrast, it was made clear that the prevention of malaria was as much the responsibility of the soldier as of the medical officer. Although this new faith in the British soldier was not entirely justified in view of the neglect of antimalaria precautions in Sicily and North Africa, there is some evidence to suggest that mepacrine may have been growing in popularity by the end of the war and that malaria prevention was becoming a standard feature of military training.
Paradoxically, the greater ability of armies to control malaria during the Second World War made the disease a more important factor in military operations. Whereas, previously, opposing forces had usually been affected by the disease in equal proportion, it was now possible for an army which took malaria control seriously to gain a comparative advantage; a feature of the Second World War which is clearly illustrated by the campaign in South East Asia. F A E Crew, the official medical historian of the Burma campaign, went so far as to suggest that the marked difference in malaria rates in the opposing forces was "one of the most important reasons why the Japanese were defeated".96 There is some truth in this but it is important to note that the medical advantage enjoyed by the Allies at this stage of the war owed as much to the military situation as it did to medical intervention and anti-malaria discipline, and particularly to the fact that Japanese supply lines had been disrupted by the retreat of their army and by superior Allied air-power. As Slim readily acknowledged, if the situation had been reversed, his army's medical advantage would have quickly disappeared. 96 Crew, op. cit., note 68 above, p. 647.
